Prince William has been making big moves behind Palace doors to face the ongoing challenges that have been a nightmare for the royal family.

King Charles has reportedly been delegating responsibilities to the Prince of Wales, knowing full well that William would be taking over the monarchy one day. Although it does not erase the fact that there is major conflict of approach between the monarch and his heir.

The royals are currently dealing with the consequences of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor’s scandals and his connection with paedophile Jeffery Epstein. While William’s cousins Beatrice and Eugenie are also faced with an uncertain future, Prince Harry and Meghan Markle are also on the future king’s agenda.

“William is not afraid to make hard calls,” one insider told journalist Rob Shuter. “And right now, that’s exactly what the Royal Family needs.”

The source pointed out that the monarchy is under “more pressure than ever” and the royals need someone who can make “tough, unpopular decisions” even if that comes with a heavy price.

“He understands the stakes,” the insider added. “This isn’t just family — it’s a business.”

William is aware of all the problems, especially the ones caused by his blood relatives and he is acting accordingly. “He’s not trying to be liked. He’s trying to protect the monarchy.”

According to friends of William’s, there is a contrast between the father and son. Charles “leads with his heart” and William “leads with strategy”.

Royal experts have claimed that the Prince of Wales has a “ruthless” approach and he “doesn’t forget and doesn’t forgive easily”.

“If you cross the line, that’s it.”

Even though Charles is still the king, he understands that William would be taking the reins in the future. Hence, while he holds authority, he has been making William a big part of all the decisions that are carried out. 

The world at large has been taken aback by Islamabad’s conspicuous role as the only interlocutor between Washington, DC and Tehran in a conflict that has also engulfed Gulf countries hosting US bases, including Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait – and to a lesser extent Oman and Saudi Arabia.

Given US President Trump’s consistently inconsistent disposition – he has regularly delivered contradictory and inflammatory statements regarding the end of hostilities – Pakistan’s role has been outstanding by any standards and has been the only ray of hope in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. While Islamabad’s untiring efforts have been appreciated by many, its prominent position has bruised New Delhi’s self-aggrandisement and hubris.

For India, it is a hard pill to swallow Pakistan’s consistently mounting relevance on the global stage. The effect was so severe that it made Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar mad enough to utter exceedingly indecent and undiplomatic words, a shockingly pejorative term regarding Pakistan in fact. Pakistan’s Foreign Office befittingly responded that the usage of such terms “betrays a deeper sense of frustration”, and “when arguments run thin, invective appears to fill the gap”.

Whatever perceptions India or other stakeholders may have of Pakistan’s global relevance, the fact is that, despite the country’s internal weaknesses, no one can deny Pakistan’s perennial geopolitical significance in the international order. 

It is appropriate to cite Hathaway, who argues in his study titled ‘The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States’ that “by most standard measures of power – population size, GDP, size and capability of its military, possession of nuclear weapons – Pakistan stands toward the top in global rankings”.

The author asserts that “as Bruce Riedel has noted, if Pakistan were dropped into a different spot on the map – say, Latin America or Africa – it would be one of the dominant countries in its region” (p 117). Hence, for many doyens, Pakistan cannot be neglected in its significance to the regional and global geopolitical and security architecture.

During the two decades of the ‘war on terror’ and the intensification of the conflict at the domestic front inside Pakistan, the country witnessed unprecedented turmoil and destruction perpetrated by foreign proxies and terrorists. During these years, Pakistan started to be portrayed as the most dangerous place in the world. Besides negative media coverage, various publications also titled the country in ways that led readers to think the situation there is precarious and that the state and society are on the verge of inevitable collapse.

For example, one commentator starts his write-up in The Atlantic with this description: “with its ‘Islamic’ nuclear bomb, Taliban- and Al-Qaeda-infested borderlands, dysfunctional cities, and feuding ethnic groups, Pakistan may well be the world’s most dangerous country, a nuclear Yugoslavia-in-the-making” (Kaplan, 2009). Manuscripts printed during this era contained titles such as ‘Descent into Chaos’ (Rashid, 2008), ‘Armageddon in Islamabad’ (Riedel, 2009), ‘Pakistan: a hard country’ (Lieven, 2011), ‘Breakdown in Pakistan’ (Bano, 2012), ‘Avoiding Armageddon’ (Riedel, 2013), ‘The Pakistan Paradox’ (Jaffrelot, 2015), ‘Pakistan at the Crossroads’ (Jaffrelot, 2016), ‘Pakistan under siege’ (Afzal, 2018) and ‘Pakistan: courting the abyss’ (Devasher, 2018). These are just a few titles besides countless media reports portraying or foretelling an imminent doomsday for Pakistan.

There is no doubt that, since the birth of this country and throughout its turbulent history, the overall economic and political landscape has not improved much more than what the nation deserves, and the country is grappling with multiple crises today as it was in the late 1990s. Pakistan, since its independence in 1947, has had to face tumultuous years for the first four decades, including wars with India and the breakup of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh in 1971. No doubt, the country is still faced with a poly-crisis comprising domestic political, economic, governance and security challenges. Yet, as in the past, it is the nation’s resilience that enables Pakistan to emerge from the abyss.

To begin with, one of the key fortes of the country is the geographical location of Pakistan: a country located at the intersection of three regions comprising Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. Because of its distinctive location, Pakistan has remained an active player in global politics and has played a dynamic role in epoch-making historical events such as the cold-war era and in the ‘war on terror’ period.

For a long time, Pakistan has occupied a key position on the global stage due to its geography, demography and other factors (such as its strong military capabilities). For example, according to Chase, Hill, and Kennedy (1999), among the world’s 140 developing states, there is a group of nine pivotal states whose status and fates are likely to significantly affect regional and even global security. Pakistan is among these nine states (others are Indonesia, India, Turkiye, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Mexico).

Pakistan and these countries have mostly been considered “pivotal states” (Chase, Hill, & Kennedy, 1996, p33) – countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. Hence, “because of its position wedged between Afghanistan and India, as well as its Indian Ocean coastline, Pakistan will continue to be a lynchpin state both for the US and for China” (Sweijs, Oosterveld, Knowles, & Schellekens, 2014, p38).

While many policy pundits indicated that Pakistan’s significance would considerably diminish for the US, particularly after the departure of its troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, the reality is that Pakistan appears to be a pivotal state in the current crisis. The country has emerged as the only actor to mediate between the US and Iran, as both countries have trust in Islamabad.

In recent years, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been remarkably successful in maintaining robust ties with both Beijing and Washington as well as with Tehran and important Gulf capitals. Islamabad’s engagement with Beijing is built on decades of mutual trust, and the relationship is multifaceted, encompassing deep defence collaboration, joint military projects, intelligence cooperation, expanded trade and economic cooperation under CPEC and Pakistan’s status as the largest recipient of Chinese arms exports since 2008. All these make Islamabad-Beijing ties quite unique without a formal defence treaty or military alliance.

At the same time, against the backdrop of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, there is no doubt that since his second arrival at the Oval Office, Pakistan has successfully engaged his administration. Islamabad has been remarkably successful in earning Trump’s accolades at several forums on multiple occasions. It is still a long shot as to what extent Pakistan can broker a much-awaited and direly needed peace deal, contingent on the behaviour of Iran and the US

The very fact that both Tehran and Washington have reposed trust in Islamabad and that Pakistan has maintained a channel of communication between the two countries signifies Pakistan’s extraordinary diplomatic efforts and stature.

The writer teaches at the University of Malakand. He can be reached at: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.

Originally published in The News

• War has reduced global oil supply by 13%, says IMF chief.
• ME conflict to dominate next week’s IMF, WB meetings.
• Barring war, IMF had expected small upgrades in outlook.

The war in the Middle East will lead to higher inflation and slower global growth, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) told Reuters on Monday, ahead of a forecast for the world economy planned by the global lender for next week.

The war has triggered the worst-ever disruption in global energy supply, with millions of barrels of oil production shuttered due to Iran’s effective blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, crucial for shipping one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas. 

Even if the conflict is swiftly resolved, the IMF is set to reduce its forecast for economic growth and bump up its outlook for inflation, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the IMF, said.

The war is expected to dominate discussions among finance officials from around the world at next week’s spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington.

The Fund is expected to release a range of scenarios in its upcoming World Economic Outlook due on April 14. 

It signalled a possible downgrade in a March 30 blog post, citing the asymmetric shock of the war and tighter financial conditions. Without the war, Georgieva said the IMF had expected a small upgrade in its projection for global growth of 3.3% in 2026 and 3.2% in 2027 as economies continue to recover from the pandemic.

“Instead, all roads now lead to higher prices and slower growth,” said Georgieva, who will preview the spring meetings in a speech on Thursday. World Bank President Ajay Banga will present his view at an Atlantic Council event on Tuesday.

“We are in a world of elevated uncertainty,” the IMF chief said, citing geopolitical tensions, technological advancements, climate shocks and demographic shifts. “All of this means that after we recover from this shock, we need to keep our eyes open for the next one.”

The war has shrunk global oil supply by 13%, Georgieva said, with the impact rippling through oil and gas shipments and into related supply chains such as helium and fertilisers.

Even a rapid end to hostilities and a fairly rapid recovery will result in a “relatively small” downward revision of the growth forecast and an upward revision of its inflation forecast, she said. If the war is protracted, the effect on inflation and growth will be greater.

Poor countries will be hit harder

Poor, vulnerable countries with no energy reserves will be hardest hit, Georgieva added, noting that many countries had little to no fiscal space to help their populations weather the price increases caused by the war, which in turn also increased the prospects of social unrest.

Georgieva said some countries had already asked for funding help, but did not name them. She said the IMF could augment some existing lending programs to meet countries’ needs. Eighty-five percent of the IMF’s members are energy importers.

Broad energy subsidies were not the answer, she said, urging policymakers to avoid government payments that could further inflame inflationary pressures.

The impact has been asymmetric, hitting energy-importing countries hardest, but even energy exporters such as Qatar are feeling the effect from Iranian strikes against their production facilities.

Qatar expects it will take three to five years to restore 17% of its natural gas production because of the damage, Georgieva said, while the International Energy Agency has reported 72 energy facilities have been damaged in the war, one-third of which have suffered significant damage.

“Even if the war is to stop today, there would be a lingering negative impact to the rest of the world,” she said.

Food security a concern

After the US and Israel attacked on February 28, Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, sending the price of crude oil and liquefied natural gas sharply higher. The international Brent crude benchmark settled near $110 on Monday, with cash benchmarks sourced to the Middle East at a substantial premium to that price.

The heads of the IMF, IEA and World Bank said last week they would form a coordinated effort to assess the energy and economic effects of the war.

Georgieva said the IMF was also engaging with the United Nations’ World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organisation on food security.

The World Food Programme said in mid-March that millions of people will face acute hunger if the war continues into June. Georgieva said the IMF did not see a food crisis yet, but that could happen if the delivery of fertilisers were impaired.