“The trade-off isn’t only ethical or economic,” Andreaux adds. “It’s also about reliability, privacy and personal security.”

Abed Kataya, digital content manager at SMEX, a Beirut-based digital rights organization focused on internet policy in the Middle East and North Africa, says piracy in the region is shaped less by culture than by structural barriers.

“I see that piracy in MENA is not a cultural choice; rather, it has multiple layers,” Kataya tells WIRED Middle East.

“First, when the internet spread across the region, as in many other regions, people thought everything on it was free,” Kataya says. “This perception was based on the nature of Web 1.0 and 2.0, and how the internet was presented to people.”

Today, he says, structural barriers still lead many users towards illegal platforms. “Users began to watch online on unofficial streaming platforms for many reasons: lack of local platforms, inability to pay, bypassing censorship and, of course, to watch for free or at lower prices.”

Payment access also remains a major factor. “Not to mention that many are unbanked, do not have bank accounts, lack access to online payments, or do not trust paying with their cards and have a general distrust of online payments,” Kataya adds.

Algerian students also share external hard drives loaded with television series, while in Lebanon streaming passwords are frequently shared across households. In Egypt, large Telegram channels distribute content across different genres, including Korean dramas, classic Arab films and underground music.

“We grew up solving problems online,” says Mira. “When something is blocked, you find a way around it. It’s … a fundamental human instinct.”

Streaming Platforms Adapting

Andreaux says StarzPlay has tried to address some of the payment barriers that limit streaming adoption in the region. “StarzPlay recognized early that payment friction was a regional barrier to adoption,” he says. “That’s why we invested in flexible subscription models and alternative payment methods, including telecom-led billing options that make access easier across different markets.”

At the same time, international media companies are working together to combat piracy through the Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment (ACE), a coalition of film studios, television networks and streaming platforms that targets illegal distribution of films, television and sports content. Its members include global companies such as Netflix as well as regional players like OSN Group, which operates the streaming service OSN+ across the Middle East and North Africa.
Kataya notes that legitimate streaming platforms are still expanding across the region. “The user base of official streaming platforms has been growing in the region,” he says. “For example, Shahid, the Saudi platform, is expanding and Netflix has dedicated packages for the region.”

“Other players, like StarzPlay and local platforms in Egypt, are also finding their place,” Kataya adds. “Social media also plays a huge role, especially when a film is widely discussed or controversial.”

Piracy carries legal and security risks, Andreaux says. “Rather than just ‘free streaming’, piracy exposes consumers to malware and insecure payment channels,” he says. “It also weakens investment in local content by depriving creators of revenue and reducing jobs.”

But the structural barriers described by users across the region remain. For many viewers in North Africa and the Levant, the challenge is not choosing between piracy and legality—it is whether legitimate access exists at all.

Minutes after Donald Trump announced that the US and Israeli governments had launched a “major combat operation” against Iran in the early hours of Saturday morning, disinformation about the attack and Tehran’s response flooded X.

WIRED has reviewed hundreds of posts on X, some of which have racked up millions of views, that promote misleading claims about the locations and scale of the attack.

Elon Musk’s social media platform is a verifiable mess: In some cases, alleged video footage of the attack shared in posts on X are actually months or years old. In several posts, video footage of apparent attacks have been attributed to incorrect locations. A number of images shared on X appear to be altered or generated with AI. Other posts attempt to pass off video game footage as scenes from the conflict.

X did not respond to a request for comment. Under Musk’s stewardship, X has become a haven for disinformation, especially during major global breaking news events. At the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, and more recently during anti-immigration enforcement protests in LA, the platform has drowned in inaccurate and faulty posts.

Almost all of the most viral posts reviewed by WIRED on Saturday came from accounts with blue check marks, meaning they pay X for its premium service and could be eligible to earn money based on how much engagement their posts generate, even if the content is false. While some posts with disinformation have a community note appended beneath them to correct the record, they remain up on the site, and it’s unclear how many people viewed them before the notes appeared.

One video posted by a blue check mark account claimed to show ballistic missiles over Dubai; the clip actually showed Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Tel Aviv in October 2024. The post has been viewed over 4.4 million times.

One of the most viral clips shared on X in the hours after the attack claims to show an Israeli fighter jet being shot down by Iranian air defense systems. The video has been shared by dozens of accounts, including one post which has been viewed more than 3.5 million times. The provenance of the video is unclear, but there have been no credible reports of any Israeli jets being shot down over Iran on Saturday.

Another account that claims to be an expert in open source intelligence posted a video showing explosions, alongside the caption: “6 Iranian Hypersonic Missiles hit the Indian-invested Israeli Haifa port. Massive damages reported.” The video has been viewed 64,000 times, but the footage was actually captured last July and shows an Israeli attack on the defense ministry in Damascus, Syria.

In a number of cases, pro-Iranian accounts have been using images and footage from Saturday’s attacks to falsely claim successful strikes against Israel. “IRANIAN MISSILE IMPACT IN TEL AVIV RIGHT NOW,” the Iran Observer account wrote in a post featuring an image of Dubai. The post had been viewed over 200,000 times before it was deleted, but dozens of other posts sharing the same image and making the same claims remain on X.

Tehran Times, a news outlet aligned with the Iranian government, posted what appears to be an AI-generated image on X which claims to show that “an American radar in Qatar was completely destroyed today in an Iranian drone strike.” The use of AI generated images was flagged on X by Tal Hagin, a senior analyst with open source intelligence company Golden Owl. While there are reports that drone and missile attacks targeted the US Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, there are no reports yet of similar successful attacks in Qatar.

A pro-Trump account, which also features a blue check mark, posted images claiming to show the before and after pictures of the palace of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which was targeted during Saturday’s missile attacks. (In a post on Truth Social, Trump claimed Khamenei was killed in an attack.) While the after picture appears to accurately show the palace after the attack, the before picture shows the Mausoleum of Ruhollah Khomeini, which is located on the other side of Tehran. The post has been viewed 365,000 times.

“This is just not the right pathway forward,” Isaacman said.

A senior NASA official, speaking on background to Ars, noted that the space agency has experienced hydrogen and helium leaks during both the Artemis I and Artemis II prelaunch preparations, and these problems have led to monthslong delays in launch.

“If I recall, the timing between Apollo 7 and 8 was nine weeks,” the official said. “Launching SLS every three and a half years or so is not a recipe for success. Certainly, making each one of them a work of art with some major configuration change is also not helpful in the process, and we’re clearly seeing the results of it, right?”

The goal therefore is to standardize the SLS rocket into a single configuration in order to make the rocket as reliable as possible, and launching as frequently as every 10 months. NASA will fly the SLS vehicle until there are commercial alternatives to launch crews to the moon, perhaps through Artemis V as Congress has mandated, or perhaps even a little longer.

Is Everyone on Board?

The NASA official said all of the agency’s key contractors are on board with the change, and senior leaders in Congress have been briefed on the proposed changes.

The biggest opposition to these proposals would seemingly come from Boeing, which is the prime contractor for the Exploration Upper Stage, a contract worth billions of dollars to develop a more powerful rocket that was due to launch for the first time later this decade. However, in a NASA news release, Boeing appeared to offer at least some support for the revised plans.

“Boeing is a proud partner to the Artemis mission and our team is honored to contribute to NASA’s vision for American space leadership,” said Steve Parker, Boeing Defense, Space & Security president and CEO, in the news release. “The SLS core stage remains the world’s most powerful rocket stage, and the only one that can carry American astronauts directly to the moon and beyond in a single launch. As NASA lays out an accelerated launch schedule, our workforce and supply chain are prepared to meet the increased production needs.”

Solid Reasons for Changing Artemis III

NASA’s new approach to Artemis reflects a return to the philosophy of the Apollo program. During the late 1960s, the space agency flew a series of preparatory crewed missions before the Apollo 11 lunar landing. These included Apollo 7 (a low-Earth-orbit test of the Apollo spacecraft), Apollo 8 (a lunar orbiting mission), Apollo 9 (a low-Earth-orbit rendezvous with the lunar lander), and Apollo 10 (a test of the lunar lander descending to the moon, without touching down).

With its previous Artemis template, NASA skipped the steps taken by Apollo 7, 9, and 10. In the view of many industry officials, this leap from Artemis II—a crewed lunar flyby of the moon testing only the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft—to Artemis III and a full-on lunar landing was enormous and risky.