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In 2026, collaboration, honesty and humility in cyber are key | Computer Weekly

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In 2026, collaboration, honesty and humility in cyber are key | Computer Weekly


If 2024 was the year AI crashed into cyber security, 2025 was the year interdependence became impossible to ignore.

Looking back over the past 12 months, the most important lesson I’ve learned is an uncomfortable one for security people: you are not really “in control” of your risk, you are sharing it. You are sharing it with suppliers, with operators, with cloud and AI platforms, and with the people on your own teams whose resilience is being stretched.

In our research at Forescout we’ve watched attacks continue to climb sharply. Across multiple reports, we’ve seen total attack volumes more than double compared with last year, and incidents in critical infrastructure grow several-fold. In the first half of 2025 alone, we tracked thousands of ransomware events worldwide, with services, manufacturing, technology, retail and healthcare consistently among the most-targeted sectors. This is no longer an IT hygiene problem; it has become a continuity problem for the real economy.

Operational technology has moved from the footnotes to the main story. Our threat intelligence work on critical infrastructure and state-aligned hacktivism has documented repeated attempts to disrupt water utilities, healthcare providers, energy companies and manufacturers by going after the industrial systems that run them. In parallel, our Riskiest Connected Devices research shows routers and other network equipment overtaking traditional endpoints as the riskiest assets in many environments, and risk concentrated in sectors that blend IT, operational tech (OT), the Internet of Things (IoT) and sometimes medical devices. The systems that keep things moving, and the devices that quietly connect them, are now prime targets.

The same interdependence is obvious when you look at the devices and components everyone depends on. In that same Riskiest Connected Devices report, we saw average device risk rise by 15% year-on-year, with routers alone accounting for more than half of the devices carrying the most dangerous vulnerabilities, and risk clustered in retail, financial services, government, healthcare and manufacturing. At the same time, our router and OT/IoT vulnerability research has shown how a single family of widely deployed network or industrial devices with remotely exploitable flaws can simultaneously expose hospitals, factories, power generators and government offices. That is not a theoretical ecosystem risk; it is a design feature of how we now build technology and deliver services. When one link is weak, the consequences propagate.

Working with organisations through real incidents this year, one pattern keeps emerging: resilience has become an ecosystem property. You can have well-managed endpoints, a competent SOC and a decent incident-response playbook and still be taken down because a third-party supplier gets hit, a “non-critical” OT asset becomes a bridge into IT (or vice-versa), or the humans running your programme are simply exhausted. Burnout is increasingly recognised as a security risk, not just an HR issue.

So, what does that mean for 2026?

One trend I expect to crystallise is what I have called “reverse ransom”. Traditionally, extortion follows the organisation that has been breached. We think attackers will increasingly flip that logic: compromise a smaller upstream manufacturer, logistics firm or service provider where defences are weaker, then apply pressure to the larger downstream brands and operators who depend on them to keep the whole chain moving. The party that can pay will no longer always be the party that was breached. For defenders, that means treating supplier visibility, shared detection and joint exercising as a core competency, rather than paperwork for procurement.

The second shift is around AI and social engineering. The novelty of AI-written phishing and voice cloning will wear off; it will just be how social engineering is done. In our 2026 predictions, we talk about “social engineering-as-a-service”: turnkey infrastructure, scripts, cloned voices, convincing pretexts and even real human operators available to anyone with a bitcoin wallet. At the same time, I expect to see more serious, less hype-driven adoption of AI on the defensive side: correlating weak signals across IT, OT, cloud and identity, mapping and prioritising assets and exposures continuously, and reducing the cognitive load on analysts by automating triage. Done properly, that is not about replacing people; it is about giving them back the headspace to think and to delve into the more rewarding stuff.

The third trend is regulatory. Between NIS2 in Europe, evolving resilience requirements in the UK and similar moves elsewhere, boards are going to discover that ecosystem security is becoming a legal duty as much as an operational one. Regulators are increasingly interested in how you manage third-party risk, how you protect critical processes, and how you evidence that your controls actually work under stress.

If 2025 taught me that complete control is largely an illusion, my hope for 2026 is that we respond with humility and collaboration rather than fear. That means investing in continuous visibility across IT, OT, IoT and cloud, building genuine partnerships with suppliers and peers rather than throwing questionnaires over the fence, and better considering the wellbeing of the people we rely on to make good decisions under pressure.

We’re never going back to a simpler threat landscape. But we can build a more honest one that acknowledges interdependence, designs for it and shares the load more intelligently.

Rik Ferguson is vice president of security intelligence at Forescout, as well as a special advisor to Europol and co-founder of the Respect in Security initiative. A seasoned cyber pro and well-known industry commentator, this is Ferguson’s first contribution to the CW Security Think Tank.



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US Special Forces Soldier Arrested for Polymarket Bets on Maduro Raid

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US Special Forces Soldier Arrested for Polymarket Bets on Maduro Raid


The Department of Justice announced Thursday that it arrested Gannon Ken Van Dyke, an enlisted member of the US Army’s special forces, for allegedly using “classified, nonpublic” information about the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro to notch more than $400,000 in profits on Polymarket trades. A grand jury indicted him on five counts, including multiple violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.

Van Dyke is the first person to be charged with insider trading on a prediction market in the United States. Lawmakers have been voicing concerns for months about the high likelihood that politicians and public servants could use nonpublic information to profit from trades on leading industry platforms like Polymarket and Kalshi, which have exploded in popularity over the past year.

The arrest comes just weeks after Department of Justice prosecutors met with Polymarket about potential insider tradition violations. In February, Israeli authorities arrested two citizens, an army reservist and a civilian, for allegedly leaking classified information by making wagers on Polymarket related to military operations. Kalshi, Polymarket’s primary rival in the United States, recently fined three politicians for breaking its insider trading rules, but it did not flag the violations for further enforcement to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal agency that oversees prediction markets.

After Van Dyke’s arrest was made public, Polymarket posted a statement to social media noting that it had “identified a user trading on classified government information” and “referred the matter to the DOJ & cooperated with their investigation.” The company declined to comment further.

According to court documents, Van Dyke has been an active duty US soldier since September 2008 and rose to the level of master sergeant in 2023. At the time of the alleged trading activity, he was stationed at Fort Bragg in Fayetteville, North Carolina, and assigned to the Army’s Special Operations Command Western Hemisphere Operations.

“I have been crystal clear that anyone who engages in fraud, manipulation, or insider trading in any of our markets will face the full force of the law,” CFTC chair Michael Selig said in a statement. “The defendant was entrusted with confidential information about US operations and yet took action that endangered US national security and put the lives of American service members in harm’s way.”

The complaint alleges that Van Dyke was involved in the planning and execution of Maduro’s arrest and that he was aware that he wasn’t authorized to share nonpublic information about US military operations. The complaint says that Van Dyke signed a nondisclosure agreement that forbade him from revealing sensitive or classified government information “by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise.” The complaint also alleges Van Dyke saved a screenshot to his Google account “displaying the results of an artificial intelligence query” outlining how the US Special Forces maintains many classified files including “operational details that are not available to the public.”

On December 26, Van Dyke allegedly opened an account on Polymarket and took out around $35,000 from his bank account before transferring it to a cryptocurrency exchange.

The following day, Van Dyke allegedly made his first Venezuela-related trade on Polymarket, putting a little less than $100 on a “YES” contract that US forces would be in Venezuela by January 31, 2026. Prosecutors accuse him of ultimately making 13 Venezuela-related transactions on the platform, seven of those—totaling hundreds of thousands of shares—on a “YES” contract for “Maduro out by … January 31, 2026.” In other words, Van Dyke allegedly stood to make an enormous profit if the Venezuelan leader wound up out of power by the end of the month.



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Newly Deciphered Sabotage Malware May Have Targeted Iran’s Nuclear Program—and Predates Stuxnet

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Newly Deciphered Sabotage Malware May Have Targeted Iran’s Nuclear Program—and Predates Stuxnet


Instead, Kamluk saw that it was a self-spreading piece of code with very different intentions. Using what was referred to within the code as “wormlet” functionality, Fast16 is designed to copy itself to other computers on the network via Windows’ network share feature. It checks for a list of security applications, and if none are present, installs the Fast16.sys kernel driver on the target machine.

That kernel driver then reads the code of applications as they’re loaded into the computer’s memory, monitoring for a long list of specific patterns—“rules” that allow it to identify when a target application is running. When it detects the target software, it carries out its apparent goal: silently altering the calculations the software is running to imperceptibly corrupt its results.

“This actually had a very significant payload inside, and pretty much everybody who looked at it before had missed it,” says Costin Raiu, a researcher at security consultancy TLP:Black who previously led the team that included Kamluk and Guerrero-Saade at Russian security firm Kaspersky, which did early work analyzing Stuxnet and related malware. “This is designed to be a long-term, very subtle sabotage which probably would be very, very difficult to notice.”

Searching for software that met the criteria of Fast16’s “rules” for an intended sabotage target, Kamluk and Guerrero-Saade found their three candidates: the MOHID, PKPM, and LS-DYNA software. As for the “wormlet” feature, they believe that the spreading mechanism was designed so that when a victim double-checks their calculation or simulation results with a different computer in the same lab, that machine, too, will confirm the erroneous result, making the deception all the more difficult to discover or understand.

In terms of other cybersabotage operations, only Stuxnet is remotely in the same class as Fast16, Guerrero-Saade argues. The complexity and sophistication of the malware, too, place it in Stuxnet’s realm of high-priority, high-resource state-sponsored hacking. “There are few scenarios where you go through this kind of development effort for a covert operation,” Guerrero-Saade says. “Somebody bent a paradigm in order to slow down or damage or throw off a process that they considered to be of critical importance.”

The Iran Hypothesis

All of that fits the hypothesis that Fast16 might, like Stuxnet, have been aimed at disrupting Iran’s ambitions of building a nuclear weapon. TLP:Black’s Raiu argues that, beyond a mere possibility, targeting Iran represents the most likely explanation—a “medium-high confidence” theory that Fast16 was “designed as a cyber strike package” that targeted Iran’s AMAD nuclear project, a plan by the regime of Ayatollah Khameini to obtain nuclear weapons in the early 2000s.

“This is another dimension of cyberattacks, another way to to wage this cyberwar against Iran’s nuclear program,” Raiu says.

In fact, Guerrero-Saade and Kamluk point to a paper published by the Institute for Science and International Security, which collected public evidence of Iranian scientists carrying out research that could contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon. In several of those documented cases, the scientists’ research used the LS-DYNA software that Guerrero-Saade and Kamluk found to have been a potential Fast16 target.



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Rednote Draws a Line Between China and the World

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Rednote Draws a Line Between China and the World


Some Rednote users have reported that their accounts were automatically converted from the Chinese to the international version of the website recently. One American user, who asked to remain anonymous to avoid being punished by the platform, shared a screenshot with WIRED showing that when he logged into the platform in April, a banner appeared that read “Your account is a rednote account. We have automatically redirected you to rednote.com.”

The user says he registered his account with a Chinese phone number years ago, but suspects his account was converted because of using a non-Chinese IP address. “I have never posted from China. It’s always been in the United States. Obviously, in one glance, they can see this is an American posting in English,” he says.

Looming Split

After TikTok sidestepped a US shutdown by selling a majority stake in its American business, most of the “refugees” who had fled to Rednote went back to the video app or to other platforms. Those who stayed often did so because they value reading about and talking directly with Chinese people living in China. They now worry that a corporate split could destroy what had been one of the strongest bridges between the Chinese internet and the wider world.

Jerry Liu, a Vancouver-based TikTok influencer known for sharing funny content about Rednote itself, said in a November video that he was told by staff at the company’s Shanghai office that international users should expect to see less Chinese content and more North American content in the future. “I feel frustrated. I think it’s just gonna be less fun,” he said in the video.

Rednote had tried the TikTok localization playbook before—it launched a slew of regionally focused apps roughly three years ago with names like Uniik, Spark, Catalog, Takib, habU, and S’More that each catered to specific countries outside China, but they failed to catch on. The effort could have been a lesson for the company about the value of its massive Chinese content ecosystem to people in other countries, but as is often the case, regulatory and political considerations appear to have taken priority.

“I don’t want to see Americans talking about Coachella. I did that on Instagram, I didn’t join Xiaohongshu to see Instagram,” says the American user who was recently redirected to Rednote.

Security Concerns

As Rednote goes global, the company is no doubt looking to Chinese predecessors like WeChat and TikTok for ideas about how to navigate the minefield of content moderation and data privacy. So far, its approach looks to more closely resemble that of WeChat.

For over a decade, WeChat has sorted users based largely on one criterion: whether they used a Chinese or a foreign number to sign up. That has allowed users to cross Tencent’s digital border by unlinking and relinking their WeChat accounts to different mobile numbers.

Jeffrey Knockel, an assistant professor of computer science at Bowdoin College, found that Tencent censors content on WeChat and Weixin differently, even though the two platforms are integrated with one another and users can communicate across them. He says Chinese users are subject to a real-time keyword-matching filter to censor politically sensitive speech, but “if you registered for WeChat using a Canadian or an American phone number, your messages aren’t necessarily under that kind of censorship.”

Knockel says WeChat’s blended content moderation approach may have made some people wary about using the app. “Users are generally distrustful of the platform. They don’t know if they’re being watched and censored,” he says. As Rednote moves in a similar direction, it will be worth watching whether international audiences end up having similar misgivings.


This is an edition of Zeyi Yang and Louise Matsakis Made in China newsletter. Read previous newsletters here.





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