Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow but vital oil trade route in the Middle East—has almost ground to a halt since the start of the United States and Israel’s war against Iran. Tankers in the region have faced military strikes and a spike in GPS jamming attacks, a new analysis says.

Since the first US-Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, more than 1,100 ships operating across the Gulf region have had their GPS or automatic identification system (AIS) communications technology disrupted, says Ami Daniel, the CEO of maritime intelligence firm Windward. Ships have been made to appear as if they were inland on maps, including at a nuclear power plant, the firm says.

The analysis comes as maritime officials have warned of a “critical” risk to ships operating in the region and as the initial conflict has quickly expanded to involve countries across the Middle East. At least three tankers in the region have been damaged in the conflict.

“We’re seeing a lot of GPS jamming,” Daniel says of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding areas. The levels of electronic interference are “way above the baseline” of usual interference, he says. “It’s becoming very dangerous to go in and out.”

Over the last few years, attacks against GPS and navigation systems have been on the rise—largely driven by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. They can impact people’s phones or devices, but also disrupt the safety and navigation systems in planes and ships. The electronic interference largely comes in two forms: jamming and spoofing. During jamming attacks, satellite signals are overwhelmed so that positioning data isn’t available. Whereas spoofing can create false signals that make an object appear incorrectly on a map—for instance, making ships appear as if they are inland at airports.

Inaccurate location data can lead to ships running off course, potentially increasing the chances of them crashing into other tankers, running aground, or causing damaging oil spills. In warzones, electronic interference is often used to try and disrupt the navigation systems of drones or missiles, which can rely on location data to find and hit their targets.

Analysis of shipping data by Windward found that there has been an “escalating” level of electronic interference across Iranian, United Arab Emirates, Qatari, and Omani waters since the initial strikes on February 28. Daniel says that the majority of the activity the company has identified so far has been jamming rather than spoofing. The company’s analysis says it has identified around 21 “new clusters” where ships have had their AIS data jammed in recent days.

“Ships were falsely positioned at airports, a nuclear power plant, and on Iranian land, creating navigation and compliance risks,” a report from the firm says. “AIS signals have also been diverted to the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant and nearby waters, while hundreds of other vessels are creating circle-like patterns off UAE, Qatari, and Omani waters.”

GPS and AIS interference within the Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding area is not new. In June 2025, as Israel and Iran exchanged missile fire, significant jamming in the region was reported.

While almost all commercial air travel has been grounded around the Middle East, there have been signs of electronic interference on aircraft flying ahead of and around the strikes. “There are at least six new spoofing signatures in the Middle East,” says Jeremy Bennington, vice president of positioning, navigation, and timing strategy and innovation at technology firm Spirent Communications. “Hundreds of flights have been impacted. However, that decreased significantly over the weekend as flights have been canceled.”

In the wake of a major series of new US and Israel-led attacks on Iran and subsequent retaliatory strikes on Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has reassured British organisations that there is likely no significant change in the direct cyber threat posed by Iranian actors.

But that despite the attacks, Iranian state threat actors likely retain some ability to conduct cyber attacks, and more widely, there is a risk of collateral impacts – such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks – originating from hacktivist groups sympathetic to Iran.

And, as the spreading conflict threatens to draw in the UK, the GCHQ-backed cyber agency said it this assessment was subject to change at short notice, and there was almost certainly a heightened risk of indirect cyber threat for any UK organisations with a presence in the Middle East.

“In light of rapidly evolving events in the Middle East, it is critical that all UK organisations remain alert to the potential risk of cyber compromise, particularly those with assets or supply chains that are in areas of regional tensions,” said NCSC director for national resilience, Jonathon Ellison.

“Today, the National Cyber Security Centre has published an alert outlining the current cyber threat to the UK and the practical steps organisations should take in response.

 “This includes engaging with our guidance to reduce the likelihood of falling victim to an attack where the cyber risk is heightened, and how critical national infrastructure organisations can prepare for and respond to severe cyber threats.

“Organisations are strongly encouraged to act now, following the recommended actions to prioritise and strengthen their cyber security posture,” said Ellison.