King Charles has indicated that the doors are open for his younger son Prince Harry as the estranged father and son reunited over a private tea in September this year.

The Duke of Sussex’s intentions to have closer ties to the UK were not so secret but when it came to Meghan Markle, experts had predicted that the Duchess of Sussex has no interest in returning to the UK.

Although, all of that changed when she stepped onto European ground by attended Paris Fashion Week in October, just weeks after the Clarence House meeting between the King and Harry. This reportedly sparked concerns for Palace aides that Meghan was potentially testing the waters by stepping into a somewhat ‘middle ground’ between the US and the royal turf.

Now, a UK barrister and broadcaster Andrew Eborn has predicted that the royal family is likely going to stay away from the As Ever founder if the “commercial clash” continues.

“I do predict there will be more visits over here and they’re certainly trying to build those bridges, but part of those building of the bridges will make sure they’re not commercialising the Royal Family and the various titles bestowed upon them.”

The royal experts have stated that the if Meghan keeps using her royal titles while pursuing money-making endeavours, the royals are likely to take a stricter action as it contradicts with the purpose of royal duties.

“The scam jam, not even proper jam, it’s the title taint,” the legal expert told Sky News. “They’re likely to keep the distance as long as she keeps using the Duchess of Sussex title for commercial ventures, like Netflix glory show.”

He noted that Meghan uses the titles to make money because people would not be interested otherwise much to the dismay of the royals. This comes as an inconvenience as removing titles of Andrew was easier given the public opinion.

Taking a drastic step for Harry or Meghan, especially a significant ratio of the public lives them, could backfire. Hence, they are also to tread carefully around the issue.

The desperate manhunt for the gunman who killed two and injured nine at Brown University entered its fourth day with investigators analysing hundreds of tips.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also released a new detailed video timeline of the suspect “casing” the campus for hours before the attack.

The enhanced footage shows the person of interest walking through Providence neighbourhoods, meticulously mapping a route that began around 10:30 a.m. (local time) Saturday, December 13, for more than five hours before the shooting inside Barus-Holley engineering building.

Providence Police Chief Col. Oscar Perez Jr. stated the individual appeared to be continuously surveilling the area.

Perez said, “What we do know is definitely that he was casing the area, and again that’s what criminals do prior to committing a crime.”

Authorities requested the public to study the suspect’s body movements, posture, and gait, hoping for a breakthrough identification.

It is important to note that all videos in the timeline came from off-campus sources. Investigators confirmed cameras inside the engineering building captured the chaos but not the shooter, who moved through an older section with little coverage.

This raises questions about the attacker’s familiarity with the location.

However, the collection of voluntary DNA samples indicates evidence was recovered at the scene, but not matched in national databases.

The campus remains on edge, with classes cancelled and a statewide review of school safety measures as ordered by the governor.

The recently released IMF Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Report (2025) has exposed the challenges related to governance and corruption in Pakistan and also highlighted the weaknesses, gaps and infirmities of the Public Sector Financial Management (PFM) system.

The strategic objective of strengthening our overall financial and economic governance structure intrinsically hinges upon a robust and efficient PFM system. In its document, the IMF has recommended an audit of supplementary grants of the last ten years by the auditor general of Pakistan (AGP).

Relentless releases of supplementary grants during a financial year vitiate the very sanctity of the budget passed by parliament and not only weaken parliamentary oversight of public finances but also raise questions about our budget-making and execution mechanisms.

There is a need to analyse the issue of supplementary grants in the context of their impact on the broader PFM ecosystem while highlighting the weaknesses identified by the IMF, including budgeting credibility issues and the transparency and accountability regime.

Supplementary grants are a critical but poorly understood component of Pakistan’s expenditure landscape, as the public is not familiar with the significant in-year adjustments that occur after the budget is passed.

The national budget is an instrument for managing the income-expenditure gap through improved tax measures to generate revenue and the setting of prudent expenditure priorities. Insufficiency of approved budgeted funds or the emergence of unforeseen needs during the financial year triggers the issuance of supplementary grants.

They provide the government with legal authority to meet unavoidable overruns, finance new policies and regularise excess expenditure in compliance with constitutional requirements.

They do not balance the budget in the strict sense. However, supplementary grants help maintain transparency by reflecting the true level of spending, allow the reallocation of savings or additional revenues to manage the overall fiscal position and ensure the continuity of essential public services.

If used excessively, these grants can weaken budget discipline and undermine the credibility of the original budget and blur the fiscal position, especially when issued late in the financial year or without matching revenue.

Within the PFM system, the budget and supplementary grants are linked and form part of the constitutional and administrative framework that regulates how public money is allocated, spent and authorised.

The primary authorisation of public expenditure originates from the annual budget, which includes estimated receipts, authorised expenditure, demands for grants and appropriations. Once passed by the National Assembly, the budget becomes the legal authority for the government to spend public funds within the approved limits.

However, experience has shown that during a fiscal year, expenditure may exceed the original budgeted amounts due to weak budget preparation and forecasting, exigencies, policy decisions, price escalations, implementation delays and mandatory payments.

Experience also shows that most grants are authorised in Quarter 4 of financial years, indicating systemic reliance on late-year budget adjustments, the settlement of liabilities and ex post regularisation. This pattern highlights inherent flaws in our budgeting and expenditure management practices that render budget controls irrelevant.

Article 84 of the Constitution allows the federal government to authorise excess expenditure during the year, subject to later parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, Section 25 of the PFM Act 2019 stipulates that “the expenditure in excess of the amount of the budget as well as expenditure not falling within the scope or intention of any grant, unless regularised by a supplementary grant, shall be treated as excess expenditure”.

Past practices have revealed that, within the ambit of this constitutional and administrative framework, successive governments have managed public expenditure by releasing supplementary grants, thereby diluting the sanctity of the budget. No doubt supplementary grants are issued to meet unforeseen needs, but they often undermine the integrity of the budget by allowing expenditure far beyond originally approved limits.

The frequent and discretionary use of supplementary grants weakens fiscal discipline, promotes overspending by ministries and conceals inefficiencies in planning and financial management.

The frequency with which supplementary grants are issued pushes public expenditure beyond the approved budget and diminishes transparency and parliamentary oversight, creating gaps between policy priorities and actual resource allocation.

Over time, this practice has eroded budget credibility, widened fiscal deficits and reduced public trust in the government’s ability to manage public finances prudently.

Supplementary grants, when issued excessively or imprudently, compromise budget integrity and distort spending priorities. They turn the budget from a binding financial plan into a flexible list, ultimately reducing trust in public financial management.

Parliamentary oversight is a function enshrined in the constitution and includes, among other things, watch and control over public funds. The ex-post regularisation mechanism for supplementary grants raises critical questions about the accountability and transparency of public funds, given the absence of proper legislative scrutiny in the National Assembly before their approval.

Proposals for supplementary grants should be discussed in parliament in the same manner as the national budget, with appropriate scrutiny to ensure transparency and accountability.

Past practice shows that the approval process for supplementary grants has oscillated between bureaucratic (Finance Division) and political (cabinet) channels, with legislative role and oversight remaining diluted and ritualistic.

Financial propriety and prudence require that supplementary grants originating during a financial year be approved in the same year, after due deliberation in the National Assembly, rather than through an ex post approval process that is a fait accompli.

Even the apex court has linked the issuance of supplementary grants to strict compliance with procedures outlined in Articles 83 and 84 of the Constitution, which means that approval of the National Assembly is required before incurring supplementary expenditure. The pattern of executive pre-approval of supplementary grants, either by the Finance Division or the cabinet, followed by ex-post regularisation, renders the role of the National Assembly largely confined to ratifying in-year executive decisions rather than shaping them. It appears that the system relies on “end-of-year, executive-driven corrections” rather than a “robust ex ante budgeting and mid-year forecasting”.

It is expected that, once the AGP releases the audit report on supplementary grants issued over the last 10 years, the public will be able to assess whether budget discipline was maintained during that period or whether the supplementary grants mechanism became a parallel funding system. The AGP’s report also needs to highlight matters relating to the exact volume, accountability aspects, transparency and oversight of these grants.

To effectively manage the issue of supplementary grants, it is necessary to streamline budgeting on a realistic basis and move away from ritualistic, incremental approaches. Budget needs should be linked to annual ministerial plans, and targets should be aligned with the strategic objectives outlined in each entity’s Medium-Term Budgetary Framework.

One tool to manage the excessive issuance of supplementary grants during the year is to establish strict criteria for approving additional funds, along with robust in-year monitoring to detect overruns at an early stage. To address transparency and oversight issues, demands for supplementary grants should be presented to the National Assembly promptly, with clear reasons and the expected impact of additional funding.

The role and capacity of the Public Accounts Committee should be strengthened for post-audit scrutiny of such funding. The government needs to adopt policies that restrict large end-of-year supplementary budgets and instead conduct mid-year reviews to adjust allocations rather than waiting until year-end.

The provision of additional allocations of funds needs to be linked to performance and aligned with medium-term fiscal plans. Learning from past deviations may help strengthen overall financial integrity and reduce unnecessary reliance on supplementary funding.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.

The writer is the former auditor general of Pakistan.

Originally published in The News