Agency workers hired to cover Birmingham bin strikers will join them on picket lines on Monday, a union has said.

A rally will be held by Unite The Union at Smithfield Depot on Pershore Street, Birmingham, on Monday morning to mark the first day of strike action by agency refuse workers.

Unite said the Job & Talent agency workers had voted in favour of strike action “over bullying, harassment and the threat of blacklisting at the council’s refuse department two weeks ago”.

The union said the number of agency workers who will join the strike action is “growing daily”.

Strikes by directly-employed bin workers, which have been running since January, could continue beyond May’s local elections.

The directly-employed bin workers voted in favour of extending their industrial action mandate earlier this month.

Unite general secretary Sharon Graham said: “Birmingham council will only resolve this dispute when it stops the appalling treatment of its workforce.

“Agency workers have now joined with directly-employed staff to stand up against the massive injustices done to them.

“Instead of wasting millions more of council taxpayers’ money fighting a dispute it could settle justly for a fraction of the cost, the council needs to return to talks with Unite and put forward a fair deal for all bin workers.

“Strikes will not end until it does.”

Elite capture is hardly a unique Pakistani phenomenon. Across developing economies – from Latin America to Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia – political and economic systems are often influenced, shaped, or quietly commandeered by narrow interest groups.

However, the latest IMF analysis of Pakistan’s political economy highlights a deeper, more entrenched strain of elite capture; one that is broader in composition, more durable in structure, and more corrosive in its fiscal consequences than what is commonly observed elsewhere. This difference matters because it shapes why repeated reform cycles have failed, why tax bases remain narrow, and why the state repeatedly slips back into crisis despite bailouts, stabilisation efforts, and policy resets.

Globally, elite capture typically operates through predictable channels: regulatory manipulation, favourable credit allocation, public-sector appointments, or preferential access to state contracts. In most emerging economies, these practices tend to be dominated by one or two elite blocs; often oligarchic business families or entrenched political networks.

In contrast, Pakistan’s system is not captured by a single group but by multiple competing elite clusters – military, political dynasties, large landholders, protected industrial lobbies, and urban commercial networks; each extracting benefits in different forms. Instead of acting as a unified oligarchic class, these groups engage in a form of competitive extraction, amplifying inefficiencies and leaving the state structurally weak.

The IMF’s identification of this fragmentation is crucial. Unlike countries where the dominant elite at least maintains a degree of policy coherence, such as Vietnam’s party-led model or Turkiye’s centralised political-business nexus, Pakistan’s fragmentation results in incoherent, stop-start economic governance, with every reform initiative caught in the crossfire of competing privileges.

For example, tax exemptions continue to favour both agricultural landholders and protected sectors despite broad consensus on the inefficiencies they generate. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises continue to drain the budget due to overlapping political and bureaucratic interests that resist restructuring. These dynamics create a fiscal environment where adjustment becomes politically costly and therefore systematically delayed.

Another distinguishing characteristic is the fiscal footprint of elite capture in Pakistan. While elite influence is global, its measurable impact on Pakistan’s budget is unusually pronounced. Regressive tax structures, preferential energy tariffs, subsidised credit lines for favoured industries, and the persistent shielding of large informal commercial segments combine to erode the state’s revenue base.

The result is dependency on external financing and an inability to build buffers. Where other developing economies have expanded domestic taxation after crises, like Indonesia after the Asian financial crisis, Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio has stagnated or deteriorated, repeatedly offset by politically negotiated exemptions.

Moreover, unlike countries where elite capture operates primarily through economic levers, Pakistan’s structure is intensely politico-establishment in design. This tri-layer configuration creates an institutional rigidity that is difficult to unwind. The civil-military imbalance limits parliamentary oversight of fiscal decisions, political fragmentation obstructs legislative reform, and bureaucratic inertia prevents implementation, even when policies are designed effectively.

In many ways, Pakistan’s challenge is not just elite capture; it is elite entanglement, where power is diffused, yet collectively resistant to change. Given these distinctions, the solutions cannot simply mimic generic reform templates applied in other developing economies. Pakistan requires a sequenced, politically aware reform agenda that aligns incentives rather than assuming an unrealistic national consensus.

First, broadening the tax base must be anchored in institutional credibility rather than coercion. The state has historically attempted forced compliance but has not invested in digitalisation, transparent tax administration, and trusted grievance mechanisms. Countries like Rwanda and Georgia demonstrate that tax reforms succeed only when the system is depersonalised and automated. Pakistan’s current reforms must similarly prioritise structural modernisation over episodic revenue drives.

Second, rationalising subsidies and preferential tariffs requires a political bargain that recognises the diversity of elite interests. Phasing out energy subsidies for specific sectors should be accompanied by productivity-linked support, time-bound transition windows, and export-competitiveness incentives. This shifts the debate from entitlement to performance, making reform politically feasible.

Third, Pakistan must reduce its SOE burden through a dual-track programme: commercial restructuring where feasible and privatisation or liquidation where not. Many countries, including Brazil and Malaysia, have stabilised finances by ring-fencing SOE losses. Pakistan needs a professional, autonomous holding company structure like Singapore’s Temasek to depoliticise SOE governance.

Fourth, politico-establishment reform is essential but must be approached through institutional incentives rather than confrontation. The creation of unified economic decision-making forums with transparent minutes, parliamentary reporting, and performance audits can gradually rebalance power. The goal is not confrontation, but alignment of national economic priorities with institutional roles.

Finally, political stability is the foundational prerequisite. Long-term reform cannot coexist with cyclical political resets. Countries that broke elite capture, such as South Korea in the 1960s or Indonesia in the 2000s, did so through sustained, multi-year policy continuity.

What differentiates Pakistan is not the existence of elite capture but its multi-polar, deeply institutionalised, fiscally destructive form. Yet this does not make reform impossible. It simply means the solutions must reflect the structural specificity of Pakistan’s governance. Undoing entrenched capture requires neither revolutionary rhetoric nor unrealistic expectations but a deliberate recalibration of incentives, institutions, and political alignments. Only through such a pragmatic approach can Pakistan shift from chronic crisis management to genuine economic renewal.

The writer is a financial market enthusiast and is associated with Pakistan’s stocks, commodities and emerging technology